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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AND 
DOMESTIC OFFICER SUITS 
 Curtis A. Bradley &  Jack L. Goldsmith† 
E RECENTLY ARGUED in these pages that interna-
tional law treats official-capacity suits brought 
against a foreign state’s officers as suits against the 
state itself and thus as subject to the state’s im-
munity, even in suits alleging human rights abuses.1 This immunity 
regime under international law differs from the immunity regime 
that applies in the United States in suits brought against state and 
federal officials for violations of federal law. Despite the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity and the immunity of state gov-
ernments under Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, courts often 
allow suits against federal and state officers for their official actions. 
While these officers can invoke individual immunity doctrines, 
typically qualified immunity, the overall immunity available in do-
mestic officer suits is narrower than the immunity available under 
international law for suits against foreign officers. 
As best we can tell, no one has ever explained why the immu-
nity rules that apply to suits against foreign officials under interna-
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1 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual 
Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 15-16, 19-22 (2009). 
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tional law differ from the immunity rules that apply to suits against 
domestic officials under U.S. domestic law. This essay attempts to 
provide such an explanation. We begin by showing that the differ-
ential treatment of foreign and domestic officer suits has deep roots 
in British and American common law. We then show that Congress 
has not acted to alter this common law backdrop, and we explain 
the significance of this fact. Finally, we discuss functional reasons 
for the long-time differential treatment of suits against domestic and 
foreign officials. 
DOMESTIC OFFICER SUITS AT COMMON LAW 
xcept to the extent they have voluntarily waived it, both the 
federal government and the state governments in the United 
States have broad immunity from suit in U.S. courts.2 Notwith-
standing this immunity, courts have long allowed suits to be 
brought against federal and state officials for acts carried out on be-
half of the government. 
Such domestic officer suits can be traced to the British common 
law, which, despite maintaining that “the King can do no wrong,” 
allowed suits against government officers, as well as certain “peti-
tions of right” directly against the Crown.3 Under this regime, the 
Crown’s immunity “did not extend to ministers and Crown offi-
cers, who were liable personally in law for anything unlawful that 
they did; and it made no difference that they were acting in an offi-
cial capacity.”4 
                                                                                                
2 On the immunity of the federal government, see, for example, FDIC v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 
(1941). On the immunity of state governments, see, for example, Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
3 See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immu-
nity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: 
Everything I Know About the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. 
LOUIS U.L.J. 393 (2005). 
4 William Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability, in THE 
NATURE OF THE CROWN: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 25-26 (Maurice 
Sunkin & Sebastian Payne eds., 1999). 
E 
Sovereign Immunity & Domestic Officer Suits 
WINTER 2010 139 
The approach of the United States to officer immunity has, with 
modifications due to its federal system, been essentially the same. A 
classic example is the Supreme Court’s 1804 decision in Little v. 
Barreme. In that case, a navy captain exceeded his statutory authority 
in seizing a vessel during the Quasi-War with France, and the Court 
held that he could be sued for damages. The Court reached this 
conclusion even though the captain had acted pursuant to instruc-
tions from the President, reasoning that “the instructions cannot 
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which with-
out those instructions would have been a plain trespass.”5 
As the Court would later explain, the basic idea behind allowing 
officer suits was that “[a]ll the officers of the government, from the 
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to 
obey it.”6 For much of the nineteenth century, the Court granted 
sovereign immunity to state and federal governments for alleged 
violations of the common law if they were named as a party of re-
cord, but denied immunity to state and federal officials regardless of 
whether they acted in an official capacity.7 The Supreme Court 
eventually retreated from this approach and in some cases began to 
look behind the complaint to determine if the government was the 
real party in interest, especially in cases that did not involve tort 
claims.8 Even with this shift, however, the Court “left in place a 
broad scope for suits against officers, as long as it could be shown 
that the officer had personally committed an actionable wrong.”9 
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court expanded the 
permissible scope of officer suits to include constitutional claims in 
addition to common law claims. In Ex parte Young, it permitted a 
suit for injunctive relief against a state attorney general for violating 
the Fourteenth Amendment in enforcing allegedly confiscatory rail-
                                                                                                
5 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804). 
6 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). 
7 See, e.g., Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 220 (1872); Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824).  
8 See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487-88 (1887). 
9 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 853 (6th ed. 2009).  
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road rates on behalf of the state.10 The reasoning underlying the Ex 
parte Young doctrine is that when an official, even in an official ca-
pacity, acts contrary to the “superior authority” of the federal Con-
stitution, the official is “stripped of his official or representative 
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his 
individual conduct.”11 Some commentators have described this rea-
soning as a “fiction,” since it envisions that an official can simultane-
ously engage in state action for purpose of constitutional liability 
but act in a personal capacity for purposes of immunity.12 As the 
Supreme Court has explained, however, the Ex parte Young rule “has 
been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate 
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to ‘the supreme 
authority of the United States.’”13  
Ex parte Young applies only to suits for prospective relief. The 
rules for suits against officials for monetary damages are more com-
plex. The Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity applies 
in damages suits brought against state officers in their “official” ca-
pacity, but not when the suit is brought against the officers in their 
“personal” capacity.14 Importantly, in distinguishing between official 
and personal capacity suits, the Court has, at least in tort cases, al-
lowed plaintiffs to decide how the case should be characterized: if 
the plaintiff pleads against an official in their personal capacity, the 
court will accept that characterization, but the plaintiff will be al-
lowed to seek damages only from the official, not the state.15 There-
fore, the bottom line in damages suits, just as with injunctive relief 
                                                                                                
10 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
11 Id. at 160. 
12 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
311 (6th ed. 2002); Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending 
to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437 (1962). But see John Harrison, Ex 
parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008).  
13 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). 
14 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).  
15 See id. This is true even if it is the state’s policy to indemnify the official. See 
generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 
84 VA. L. REV. 47 (1998). 
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under Ex parte Young, is that plaintiffs can plead around state sover-
eign immunity by suing state officials rather than the state itself.16 A 
similar regime applies to suits against federal officials for constitu-
tional violations.17 
Although federal and state officials are often unable to invoke 
the immunity of the government itself, they are allowed to invoke 
individual immunity doctrines. Most relevant for present purposes, 
officials carrying out executive and administrative functions are 
generally entitled to qualified immunity. This immunity shields 
them from damages claims unless it is shown that they violated 
“clearly established” federal rights “of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”18  
FOREIGN OFFICER SUITS AT COMMON LAW 
nlike the common law immunity regime applicable to domes-
tic officials, at common law in both Great Britain and the 
United States, suits against foreign officials for their official acts 
were considered suits against the foreign state and thus were subject 
to the state’s immunity. 
Referring to “principles of English law which are so well known 
that I refrain from citing authority,” an eminent British judge ex-
plained in 1964 that “[a] foreign sovereign government . . . can act 
only through agents, and the immunity to which it is entitled in re-
spect of its acts would be illusory unless it extended also to its 
agents in respect of acts done by them on its behalf.”19 Nearly a cen-
                                                                                                
16 Plaintiffs appear to have less leeway in avoiding sovereign immunity when bring-
ing contract-oriented claims. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 
(1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945).  
17 See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 89 (4th ed. 
2006). For state law claims, however, the Westfall Act provides federal officials 
with broader immunity than state officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).  
18 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This immunity did not develop in the common law until 
late in the nineteenth century. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 996. In 
earlier cases, such as Little v. Barreme, good faith was not a defense. 
19 Zoernsch v. Waldock [1964] 1 WLR 675, 692 (C.A.).  
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tury earlier, a British court dismissed a suit against agents of Peru 
who had issued Peruvian government bonds, reasoning: “You can-
not sue the Peruvian Government . . . and it would be a monstrous 
usurpation of jurisdiction to endeavour to sue a foreign government 
indirectly, by making agents in this country defendants.”20 
The same rule prevailed in the United States. An early recogni-
tion of the rule came in a 1794 opinion of Attorney General Wil-
liam Bradford concerning a state court prosecution of the former 
Governor of French Guadaloupe for condemning an American ves-
sel during his time in office. Bradford reasoned: “if the seizure of 
the vessel is admitted to have been an official act, done by the de-
fendant by virtue, or under color, of the powers vested in him as 
governor, that it will of itself be a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's 
action.”21 
Four years later, Attorney General Charles Lee, commenting on 
a civil suit against a British agent, similarly proclaimed: “it is as well 
settled in the United States as in Great Britain, that a person acting 
under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not 
amenable for what he does in pursuance of his commission, to any 
judiciary tribunal in the United States.”22 Citing these and other ex-
amples, the Second Circuit declared a century later that “[t]he law 
officers of the United States have uniformly advised the executive 
                                                                                                
20 Twycross v. Dreyfus, (1877) 5 Ch. D. 605, 618 (James, L.J.). See also Jones v. 
Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, para. 
10, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (Bingham, L.J.) (citing “wealth of authority” for the 
proposition that “[t]he foreign state’s right to immunity cannot be circumvented 
by suing its servants or agents”). 
21 Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Atty Gen. 45, 46 (1794). Before Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), immunity for foreign officials had the status in 
the United States of general common law rather than federal law. Probably for 
this reason, Attorney General Bradford disclaimed the authority to interfere in 
the state court proceedings, although the plaintiff nevertheless discontinued the 
case after the issuance of Bradford’s opinion. See Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 247, 248 n.* (1796). 
22 1 Op. Atty Gen. 81 (1797). Following Attorney General Bradford’s 1794 opin-
ion, Attorney General Lee disclaimed authority to interfere in the state court 
proceeding.  
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department that individuals are not answerable in foreign tribunals 
for acts done in their own country, in behalf of their government, 
by virtue of their official authority.”23 
The famous Caroline incident of 1837 implicated a similar princi-
ple. The Caroline was an American steamboat that British troops 
destroyed in American waters after it had been seen carrying arms 
to Canadian rebels. Three years later, New York state officials ar-
rested Alexander McLeod, a British citizen, and charged him with 
murder and arson in connection with the incident. The British For-
eign Minister objected to the indictment on the ground that 
McLeod was immune from prosecution because he was a British 
official who had carried out a public function on Britain’s behalf.24 
Importantly, Secretary of State Daniel Webster agreed with this 
contention. He stated: “The Government of The United States en-
tertains no doubt that, after this avowal of the transaction, as a pub-
lic transaction, authorized and undertaken by the British authorities, 
individuals concerned in it ought not, by the principles of public 
law, and the general usage of civilized States, to be holden person-
ally responsible in the ordinary tribunals of law, for their participa-
tion in it.”25 
The Supreme Court’s late nineteenth-century decision in Un-
derhill v. Hernandez also endorsed the immunity of foreign officials 
for their official acts.26 In Underhill, a U.S. citizen sued a Venezuelan 
military commander, whose revolutionary government had been 
recognized by the United States, for unlawful assault and detention 
in Venezuela. The decision is most famous for its articulation of the 
act of state doctrine, pursuant to which “the courts of one country 
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
                                                                                                
23 Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d on other grounds, 
168 U.S. 250 (1897) . 
24 See Letter from Mr. Fox to Mr. Webster (Mar. 12, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRITISH 
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1840-1841, at 1127 (1857). 
25 Id. at 1131 (Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841)). Like his 
predecessors, see supra notes 21, 22, Webster disclaimed authority to interfere 
with the ongoing state court proceedings. Id. at 1132. 
26 168 U.S. at 252.  
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done within its own territory.” The Supreme Court also recog-
nized, however, “[t]he immunity of individuals from suits brought 
in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the 
exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as 
military commanders.”27 Similarly, the lower court in that case 
noted that, “because the acts of the official representatives of the 
state are those of the state itself, when exercised within the scope of 
their delegated powers, courts and publicists have recognized the 
immunity of public agents from suits brought in foreign tribunals 
for acts done within their own states in the exercise of the sover-
eignty thereof.”28 
In several cases in the twentieth century, U.S. courts acknowl-
edged the same principle. In Lyders v. Lund, a 1929 decision in a suit 
to recover lawyer’s fees and expenses from a consul of Denmark, 
the court noted that “in actions against the officials of a foreign state 
not clothed with diplomatic immunity, it can be said that suits based 
upon official, authorized acts, performed within the scope of their 
duties on behalf of the foreign state, and for which the foreign state 
will have to respond directly or indirectly in the event of a judg-
ment, are actions against the foreign state.”29 Similarly, in Heaney v. 
Government of Spain, a case involving a contract claim brought against 
a Spanish consul, the Second Circuit stated that the immunity of a 
foreign state extends to any “‘official or agent of the state with re-
spect to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of exer-
cising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the 
state.’”30 The court in Heaney quoted for this proposition a provision 
in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1965, 
which purported to summarize the common law up to that point.31 
                                                                                                
27 Id. 
28 65 F. at 579.  
29 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929). The court also noted that the private or 
unauthorized acts of such officials would not warrant immunity, and outlined the 
process whereby the consul could make a showing that his acts were in fact offi-
cial.  
30 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971).  
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
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CONGRESS AND THE COMMON LAW 
he common law’s differential treatment of immunity in suits 
against domestic officials and immunity in suits against foreign 
officials is of course subject to alteration by Congress. The next 
question, therefore, is whether Congress has done anything to alter 
this common law backdrop. In analyzing this question, an important 
canon of construction is that legislation in an area governed by the 
common law is ordinarily construed so that it does not override the 
common law absent some clear indication of congressional intent to 
do so.32  
As we explained in our previous essay, the most relevant juris-
dictional statute in suits against foreign officials is the 1976 Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which establishes a presumption 
of immunity in suits against states, subject to specific statutory ex-
ceptions.33 We argued in that essay that the FSIA’s immunity for 
states should be construed to extend to state officers who act in an 
official capacity. Even if one does not accept that construction of the 
FSIA, however, foreign officer immunity should continue to be 
available as a matter of common law, since there is no indication in 
the FSIA’s text or legislative history that Congress intended to ab-
rogate this common law immunity.34  
The presumption against statutory derogation of common law 
immunities is not only relevant to jurisdictional statutes like the 
                                                                                                
STATES § 66 (1965). See also Bradford v. Director General of Railroads of Mex-
ico, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. 1925) (treating contract suit brought against a Mexican 
official as a suit against Mexico and thus as subject to Mexico’s sovereign immu-
nity). 
32 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 14. 
33 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605.  
34 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 14. Courts applying a common law of 
immunity in ATS cases would do so pursuant to the common law authority that 
the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), found im-
plicit in the ATS. More broadly, courts would be required to develop any com-
mon law immunity rules in a manner consistent with the political branches’ pol-
icy choices, including choices reflected in the FSIA. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
2129, 2160-67 (1999). 
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FSIA. It is also relevant to causes of action, where the Court has 
gone so far as to “presume[] that Congress intended to incorporate 
well-established common law rules that were in operation at the 
time the statutes were passed into the causes of action created by 
the statutes.”35 For example, courts have construed the cause of ac-
tion statute most frequently invoked in domestic officer litigation – 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – to be subject to common law immunity de-
fenses. As the Supreme Court has explained, Section 1983 has been 
construed to be “in harmony with general principles of tort immu-
nities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”36 
The principal statutory basis for human rights litigation against 
foreign officials is the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Arguments in favor 
of preserving the common law immunity regime are even stronger 
under the ATS than under Section 1983. The ATS has not been sub-
stantively modified since it was first enacted as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789. Nothing in the text of the statute or in the timing of its 
enactment indicates that Congress in any way limited common law 
immunity. Moreover, the Supreme Court made clear in Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain that the ATS, unlike Section 1983, is a jurisdictional 
statute that does not itself confer a cause of action, and that ATS 
claims result from federal courts’ “residual common law discre-
tion.”37 The presumption that a cause of action does not abrogate 
common law immunity should be at least as powerful when the 
cause of action is itself fashioned from the common law.38 Indeed, 
the central reason why the Court in Sosa permitted a “modest num-
ber” of modern international law claims under the ATS was to pre-
                                                                                                
35 Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 695, 698 (1997).  
36 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). 
37 542 U.S. 692, 712, 738 (2004).  
38 Another statute relevant to human rights litigation – the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act (TVPA) – does provide a cause of action for certain claims of torture and 
extrajudicial killing committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. The TVPA does not mention 
immunity, much less limit it, and the legislative history disavows any intent to 
affect immunity. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 20. 
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serve the historic common law backdrop against which the ATS was 
enacted, pursuant to which a handful of international law claims 
could have been brought against private actors without the need for 
a statutory cause of action.39 This common law backdrop includes 
common law immunity rules.  
FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
e now consider the functional justifications that might ex-
plain why the immunity regime for suits against foreign of-
ficials is so different than the one that applies to suits against domes-
tic officials. Because the immunity issue arises most frequently 
when executive officials are sued, we will focus on the contrast be-
tween the qualified immunity that domestic executive officials re-
ceive for their official acts and what is in effect an absolute immu-
nity accorded to foreign officials for their official acts.  
The qualified immunity doctrine that has been developed in do-
mestic cases “is the result of the balancing of ‘fundamentally antago-
nistic social policies.’”40 Allowing civil damages for government 
wrongdoing vindicates federal law, compensates victims, deters 
future misconduct, and spreads the risk of government harm among 
all taxpayers.41 Immunity from suit, by contrast, promotes vigorous 
public decisionmaking and allows officials to concentrate on their 
public duties without fear of harassing litigation.42 As noted above, 
the Supreme Court has balanced these social policies for U.S. offi-
cials by conferring immunity on those officers who do not violate 
clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have 
known.  
At first glance, and setting doctrine and historical practice aside 
for a moment, it might seem that the functions served by civil dam-
                                                                                                
39 542 U.S. at 724.  
40 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 695 n.13 (1987) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959) (plurality opinion)).  
41 See, e.g., Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 & n.39 (1980) (risk-
spreading and law vindication); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 
(1978) (compensation and deterrence).  
42 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 
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ages (subject to qualified immunity) in domestic officer suits also 
apply to human rights cases against foreign officials. After all, the 
award of civil damages in ATS cases against foreign officials can be 
seen as vindicating international law and serving the same functions 
of compensation, deterrence, and risk-spreading goals as liability for 
domestic officers. Nonetheless, there are discontinuities between 
domestic and foreign officer suits that help to explain the difference 
between domestic and foreign officer immunity rules.  
In the domestic context, there is a debate about whether the ju-
diciary should be attempting to balance the complicated domestic 
social tradeoffs necessary to develop an optimal liability/immunity 
regime.43 Regardless of how that debate is resolved, U.S. courts 
face substantially greater challenges in identifying and resolving 
these social tradeoffs for other countries. Foreign nations have dif-
ferent legal and political cultures, different attitudes toward spread-
ing risk through civil damages, and different degrees of wealth (and 
thus different capacities to pay civil damages). Courts would need 
to take account of these and other factors to adequately balance the 
“fundamentally antagonistic social policies” relevant to designing a 
liability/immunity regime. It is doubtful, however, that they have 
either the necessary information or expertise to engage in this exer-
cise, and it is almost certain that such an exercise would be per-
ceived by other nations as illegitimate. 
One way to appreciate this point is to consider the foreign fiscal 
consequences of civil liability for foreign officials in U.S. courts.44 
Just as state and federal governments often feel compelled to in-
demnify officials for damages assessed in civil cases arising from 
their official acts,45 so too foreign countries will often feel com-
pelled to indemnify their officials for any damages awarded in an-
other nation’s court. If a U.S. court awards civil damages against a 
                                                                                                
43 See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611-12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
44 We thank John Harrison for this insight. One limitation on this point is that, on 
average, it will likely be more difficult to enforce monetary judgments against 
foreign officials than against domestic officials. 
45 See Jeffries, supra note 15, at 50.  
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foreign official, it would (in those cases where the foreign state feels 
compelled to indemnify) effectively require the expenditure of for-
eign public funds that the foreign state might think are better spent 
on other public goals in that country (including goals related to the 
alleged human rights abuses in question, such as community re-
building and development). Foreign nations understandably do not 
trust U.S. courts to manage their public administration and fiscal 
matters, especially since (unlike in the purely domestic officer suit) 
the costs of mistaken overcompensation by the U.S. courts are not 
borne by the United States political community but rather are 
borne by the foreign community, which must spend money in ways 
contrary to its wishes. 
Unlike in the domestic realm, a qualified immunity regime in 
foreign officer cases would not adequately address these concerns. 
The Supreme Court does not play the same role in ATS suits against 
foreign officers, which typically allege violations of international 
law rights, that it plays in domestic officer cases, which typically 
allege constitutional violations. The Supreme Court is the definitive 
interpreter of what counts as “clearly established” constitutional law 
in its qualified immunity decisions, and these decisions have a high 
degree of legitimacy within the U.S. system. By contrast, the Su-
preme Court is one of hundreds of non-definitive interpreters 
around the globe of what counts as “clearly established” interna-
tional law. Moreover, in contrast to its constitutional law interpre-
tations, its interpretations of international law are often viewed 
around the world as idiosyncratic. In particular, the practice of 
some lower courts in the United States of imposing civil liability for 
alleged human rights abuses committed abroad is viewed outside 
the United States as illegitimate and indeed as contrary to interna-
tional law.46 In short, the notion of “clearly established law” makes 
much less sense in the typical foreign officer suit than in the typical 
domestic officer suit.47  
                                                                                                
46 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 22-23. 
47 Cf. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Williams, J., 
concurring) (rejecting argument that foreign officials should be denied immunity 
for egregious human rights violations because, under that approach, “immunity 
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One might argue that these considerations do not matter, and 
that the central consideration should be the vindication of interna-
tional law, just as civil liability in the domestic realm is thought 
necessary to vindicate constitutional law. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that there are numerous methods of accountability 
besides civil liability in foreign courts for alleged human rights 
abuses by government officials, including civil or criminal liability in 
the home country, or one of a variety of international criminal 
courts. In addition, the difficulty of translating the “vindication of 
law” argument to the foreign officer context becomes apparent 
when one considers the remedy of injunctions. This remedy, a cen-
tral vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights in domestic officer 
suits, is assumed not to be available in suits concerning violations of 
international human rights law by foreign officials – and, indeed, 
we are not aware of a single ATS decision that has awarded such 
relief. 
This leads to the final and in some sense most fundamental func-
tional difference between domestic and foreign officer suits: the 
overlay of foreign relations considerations that apply to the latter. 
Because of the factors already mentioned, foreign officer suits in 
U.S. courts are controversial, and threaten international discord.48 
Numerous foreign relations law doctrines, such as the act of state 
doctrine, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the rule of 
non-inquiry in extradition cases are designed to ensure, on separa-
tion of powers grounds, that unelected and unaccountable courts do 
not inadvertently, or without clear political branch guidance, pur-
sue a course of action in litigation that threatens international dis-
cord.49 The Supreme Court in Sosa relied on precisely these factors 
                                                                                                
could be determined only at the moment of resolution on the merits, at which 
point it would commonly be irrelevant”). 
48 See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: 
The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9 
(2009); see also Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1291 (Williams, J., concurring). 
49 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (act of 
state doctrine); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (presumption against extraterritoriality); 
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in urging “judicial caution” in the development of ATS causes of 
action.50  
CONCLUSION 
or hundreds of years in both Great Britain and the United 
States, courts accorded broader immunity in foreign officer 
suits than in domestic officer suits. There is no indication in any of 
the relevant statutes that Congress has attempted to override this 
common law backdrop. There also continue to be good functional 
reasons for preserving the distinction between domestic and foreign 
officer suits. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2226 (2008) (rule of non-inquiry).  
50 See 542 U.S. at 725, 727, 728. 
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